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The global workspace and metacogni-
tion are, respectively, the basis of the
two leading cognitive theories of
consciousness.
The two theories, which have recentlyThe two leading cognitive accounts of consciousness currently available con-
cern global workspace (a form of working memory) and metacognition. There is
relatively little interaction between these two approaches and it has even been
suggested that the two accounts are rival and separable alternatives. Here, we
argue that the successful function of a global workspace critically requires that
the broadcast representations include a metacognitive component.been presented as rivals, are usually pur-
sued separately, but there is no need to
choose between them.
There is in fact strong reason to expect
items in the global workspace to have a
metacognitive accompaniment in the
form of a rating of conﬁdence.
Conﬁdence ratings are relied on by the
computations that compare, integrate,
and compute over representations in
the global workspace.
Recent empirical ﬁndings support the hy-
pothesis that representations in the
global workspace always carry with
them a measure of conﬁdence.
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While people generally think they know what consciousness is, it has proved difﬁcult to
operationalise. Many competing approaches exist. Here, we consider the two most prominent
theories that use a cognitive framework. One theory, which evolved from the concept of working
memory [1], proposes that, when mental representations are conscious (see Glossary), they are
in a global workspace that is accessible to a variety of cognitive processes [2–4]. The other
theory asserts that representations associated with consciousness always have a metacognitive
component, such as a degree of confidence [5–9].
A common view is that the global workspace and metacognition are two distinctly different ways
of making a cognitive system more sophisticated. Each is useful in its own right and they are
dissociable: a representation can be globally available or access conscious without having
any metacognitive component and vice versa [10]. As a consequence, global availability and
metacognition are rarely studied together and there is disagreement about which is more impor-
tant for understanding consciousness. By contrast, we argue that conscious representations are
characterised by both global availability and metacognition. Speciﬁcally, we contend that repre-
sentations in the global workspace always have a metacognitive component.
Distinguishing the Two Theories
The global workspace approach arises from the observation that consciousness appears to
make information globally available to a range of widely different mental processes, such as rea-
soning, recollecting, planning, intention forming, and verbal report. The global workspace is pos-
tulated as the functional [2] and neural [3] basis of global availability and, thus, of consciousness. It
is assumed that representations enter the workspace after processing has taken place in
domain-specific systems (perception, emotion, motor control, etc., modulated by attention,
which can reﬂect the goals of the agent). Thus, the global workspace is a form of working mem-
ory. Since it is controversial whether consciousness is required to merely maintain a representa-
tion in working memory, our focus here is the working memory system that allows
representations to be manipulated (Box 1). Global broadcasting enables such manipulation,
and that is thought to be an important function of the global workspace.
The link between metacognition and consciousness traces back to the longstanding intuition
that, if an agent is unable to track or reﬂect on a particular mental state, then that state cannot
be conscious. If this is the case, then some kind of metacognition would be associated with all
representations that are conscious. Here, we are particularly concerned with metacognition as
the conﬁdence we have in a representation (although other metacognitive parameters mayTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xx https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2019.04.007 1
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Glossary
Access conscious: a content is
access conscious just in case a
representation with that content is
globally available.
Coarse-graining: a simpliﬁcation of a
system that is a more speciﬁc reﬂection
of the microscale details. Effective
coarse-graining enables modelling of the
behaviour of a systemwithout specifying
all of the underlying causes that lead to
system state changes.
Confidence: a representation of the
probability that a representation is
correct or, more broadly, of its reliability
or appropriateness. Thus, a degree of
certainty or uncertainty.
Conscious: part of a person’s
subjective experience, here understood
as being a matter of global availability
Box 1. Manipulation of Items in Working Memory
It is controversial whether consciousness (in the sense of global availability) is required merely to maintain a representation
in working memory (WMmaintenance) but less controversial that consciousness is required for a representation to enter
into that form of working memory that allows representations to be compared and manipulated (WM manipulation).
Mere maintenance in workingmemory appears to be a distinct process [91–93]. There is growing evidence thatWMmain-
tenance is possible in the absence of sustained neural activity [94]. WM maintenance may exist even for representations
that have never been conscious and/or globally broadcast [95,96]. There is in fact little evidence that it is possible to main-
tain a representation in working memory on which action initiation, reasoning, or decision can be based without that rep-
resentation having previously been made globally available ([97] cf. [98]), but our argument here does not rely on assuming
that consciousness is required for a representation to enter WM maintenance.
By contrast, there is little evidence for WM manipulation of representations that have never been made globally available
[99–102]. Accordingly, for the purpose of our argument, we assume only that global broadcast is needed for WM manip-
ulation. An important function of global broadcasting is that it allows representations from different domain-speciﬁc sys-
tems to be put into contact with one another, in a workspace, such that they can be processed together. While
nonconscious information can be integrated in the brain in a way that does not depend on working memory or attentional
resources [103], the system for WM manipulation allows that to be achieved in a domain-general way, putting represen-
tations into contact with one another that have not previously been experienced together.
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Domain-specific systems:
perceptual, affective, and motoric
systems processing information from a
particular domain that are able to
perform appropriately through having
been exposed to a wealth of experience
in the domain during evolution and/or
learning (e.g., object
perception, reaching and grasping,
phonetic perception and production,
and mentalizing).
Fluency: the speed and ease with
which a representation is retrieved. This
applies to perceptions, actions, and
memories.
Globally available representation:
information represented in a system and
format such that it can be used, without
undergoing further processing, by a
wide range of cognitive processes
(e.g., reasoning, planning, intention
formation, mentalizing, verbal report,
and storage in episodic and semantic
memory).
Global workspace: a mechanism that
forms the functional and neural basis for
representations to be made globally
available.
HOT theories of consciousness:
claim that having a conscious
experience with the content p depends
on a further representation that one is in
a ﬁrst-order state with the content p.
Consider the sentences ‘John is
uncertain’ and ‘John is sure that Tehran
is the capital of Iran’. Both are at the
metalevel, but the latter is richer in that it
re-represents the content of John’s
belief. HOT theories claim that
consciousness depends on having aalso have a role). According to theories that link consciousness to metacognition in this speciﬁc
sense, a conscious representation of some aspect of the world (e.g., a percept) is accompanied
by, or contains a sense of, certainty or uncertainty; that is, a sense of whether the representation
is likely to be correct. Thus, a percept both represents that the world is a certain way, p, and at the
same time represents itself as having a particular property (e.g., being likely to be correct). Impor-
tantly, this need not involve re-representing the content p. This is crucially different from the
metacognitive account of consciousness put forward byHOT theories of consciousness [11].
Of course, cognitive systems can represent probabilities without being metacognitive. For exam-
ple, when visual systems deploy a probabilistic population code for motion direction [12], what is
represented is the probability that the observed motion is in direction s (as s ranges over 360° of
possible motion directions). This does not involve a representation of conﬁdence.
It does not follow from these deﬁnitions that global availability and metacognition must be tightly
associated. There is no conceptual or necessary connection between them. Furthermore, al-
though studies have shown that some types of metacognition do concern information that is
globally available [13–15], other types of metacognition appear not to depend on consciousness
[16–18]. Given these ﬁndings, we agree that not all metacognitive states are globally available.
Our focus is instead on the dissociation in the other direction. Do all globally available representa-
tions have a metacognitive component? If true, that claim would be novel, substantive, and con-
trary to the common claim that the two dissociate [10,19–21].
Connection to Verbal Report
The two theories discussed here both preserve the strong connection that intuitively exists between
consciousness and verbal report: an adult suffering no pathology in normal conditions can generally
tell you about their conscious states. Both the global workspace andmetacognition have a critical role
in the ability to give verbal reports about the contents of consciousness ([22] p. 468; [23]).
However, enabling verbal reports is not the only function of the global workspace. Globally avail-
able representations are brought together in the workspace (aka working memory) so that cog-
nitive work can be done with them [2,3,24].
Similarly, although metacognition does allow people to tell one another about their conﬁdence
[23], this is not its only function. Conﬁdence, or uncertainty, is a metacognitive parameter
thought that re-represents the content of
the conscious state.
Metacognition: a representation or
evaluation of another cognitive state or
process. Conﬁdence and its associates
(our main focus here) are forms of
metacognition.
Metacognitive parameter: a property
of cognitive process or of the content of
a mental representation. Metacognitive
parameters include conﬁdence
(certainty/uncertainty), ﬂuency,
familiarity, and, in some circumstances,
precision.
Percept: a conscious perceptual
representation of the world, formed on
the basis of sensory evidence.
Precision: the inverse of the variance of
a signal. Low precision may reﬂect
variation in the world and/or noise in
processing. When precision is relied on
in cue combination (see main text),
systems treat it as reﬂecting noise in
different perceptual channels, hence
uncertainty. Treated that way, precision
Trends in Cognitive Sciencesassociated with representations at all levels of the cognitive hierarchy and has a critical role
in computations performed on these representations. For example, the automatic process through
which different sources of perceptual evidence are combined (e.g., vision and touch) involves
weighting by the relative precision of the different signals [25,26]. If conscious representations
include a conﬁdence parameter, then it would similarly allow them to be weighed and compared.
Our Hypothesis and a Simple Model
Our Hypothesis
Our hypothesis is that the cognitive work carried out in the workspace calls for metacognition.
Metacognitive parameters, such as conﬁdence, enable the computation of a common metric
so that information from many different sources can be directly compared and combined [27].
Creation of a common metric is particularly necessary for the efﬁcient functioning of the global
workspace. The workspace contains representations broadcast from very different systems (per-
ceptual, motoric, affective, and mnemonic). These need to be made available in a way that allows
them to be brought together, so that the representations can be compared and combined to
make decisions and reasoned over to plan for action ([28] p. 92). This is the function of estimates
of conﬁdence. For example, when people engage in conscious reasoning, they need to weigh
items of information by their associated levels of conﬁdence. Our claim is that effective perfor-
mance of the function served by the global workspace therefore depends on metacognition. If
so, we should expect representations in the global workspace always to include, or to be accom-
panied by, a metacognitive content (e.g., conﬁdence).The Hypothesis
Representations in the global workspace always have a metacognitive component
becomes a metacognitive parameter.
Scale-free: a representation that is
independent of an absolute metric
(e.g., percentage scores or standard
scores).
WMmaintenance: a form of working
memory that maintains a representation
in an active state. Current evidence
suggests a representation can be
maintained in working memory without
remaining conscious (Box 1 in the main
text).
WMmanipulation: a form of working
memory that allows representations to
be integrated, manipulated, and altered
(i.e., a workspace). Experiments suggest
that, for such manipulation to occur, the
representations must be, or have been,
in consciousness.A Simple Model
Our proposal concerns the relationships between consciousness, globally broadcast representa-
tions, working memory, and metacognition. Our assumption is that consciousness, in the form of
global broadcast, is the gateway to a form of working memory that allows representations to be
compared and manipulated (WMmanipulation; Box 1). An important function of global broad-
casting is to make such manipulation possible.
We present our hypothesis in the context of a simple model where there are three types of
process: inputs, workspace transitions, and outputs [29–31]: (i) Inputs: ﬁrst, representations
from selected domain-speciﬁc systems are broadcast to the workspace in a highly compressed
form; (ii) transitions: second, these compressed representations are brought together andmanip-
ulated so that the agent can draw conclusions and make decisions; and (iii) outputs: third, these
manipulated representations in turn drive actions, including verbal reports, via appropriate
domain-speciﬁc systems (Figure 1). All three processes can be said to involve ‘decisions’, either
taken by domain-speciﬁc mechanisms (e.g., the selection of what to broadcast is sometimes
called a perceptual decision) or by the agent. We propose that metacognitive parameters, such
as conﬁdence, have a vital role in all three of these processes. Here, we are particularly concerned
with the role of metacognition in the manipulation of representations in the workspace.
Functional Argument
Our proposal is that conscious (globally broadcast) representations need to carry with them amea-
sure of conﬁdence. Our argument is essentially functional. We have previously proposed that,
when information is shared between people in the service of joint decision-making, it is advanta-
geous if the information is associated with a degree of certainty [23]. In the case of suprapersonal
cognitive control, conﬁdence sharing can be used to enable a dyad to make near-optimal use of
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Figure 1. A SimpleWorkspaceModel with Inputs, Transitions, andOutputs. Input processes: the inputs to theworkspace come from a variety of domain-speciﬁc
systems. The two shown here (reaching and grasping, and social cognition) would be required for solving the delicate problem of ‘when and how to shake hands’. These
perceptuomotor systems process a wealth of information nonconsciously in the service of action. They deal in rich probabilistic hypotheses, perhaps even a full probability
distribution over available possibilities ([78,79] but see also [80]). Through constant interaction with the world, domain-speciﬁc systems have learnt how to update
probabilistic hypotheses in real time, approximating or perhaps implementing inferences that are Bayesian or otherwise optimal [81,82]. What is selected for global
broadcast is a representation of a single state of affairs (cf. [83]), for example a maximum likelihood estimate, rather than a whole range of alternate possibilities [84–86].
These representations are a highly compressed summary of some of this information, involving substantial data reduction. The compression is achieved by coarse-
graining, and by leaving some variables and states out of the representation in such a way that the effective information in the representation is increased [87]. This
permits better communication of information within the workspace. Simpliﬁcation is also needed to solve complex, multistep planning problems [88]. In the task
involved in our example, one representation broadcast to the work space concerns the ease with which a hand shake could be achieved, the other concerns an
inference about whether this person would expect a handshake. Workspace transitions: within the workspace, these compressed representations are manipulated
and compared in order to draw conclusions or take decisions [46,54]. Estimates of conﬁdence in these representations will have an important role in reaching
decisions. This is discussed further in the main text. Output processes: the representations in the workspace are taken up by the appropriate domain-speciﬁc systems,
leading to alterations in their state estimates. This will sometimes lead to action (e.g., the hand is shaken) and also a potential verbal output (e.g., reporting why I thought
it appropriate, or not, to shake hands). The verbal reports frequently concern the subject’s conﬁdence about an item in the workspace. This would include conﬁdence in the
inputs (e.g., a percept) as well as in the outputs (e.g., a decision). How conﬁdence is reported will be modiﬁed by the social context in which the report is made [89], taking
into account strategic considerations [90]. Verbal reports can modify representations in the workspaces of others [23].
Trends in Cognitive SciencesThe functional consideration that favours conﬁdence sharing between individuals applies equally
when cognitive control is operating within an individual. The manipulation function of the
workspace requires representations that conﬂict or support one another to be weighed and
integrated so that conclusions can be drawn and decisions reached. That can be done more
effectively if the representations contain, or are accompanied by, a rating of conﬁdence or
uncertainty (or other relevant metacognitive parameter). Computational models show that the
beneﬁts justify the extra cost of tracking conﬁdence, and there is extensive evidence that this
principle is relied on by other cognitive systems (Box 2).
Our thesis is not that workingmemorymanipulationsmust involvemetacognition. A system could
reason and take decisions with representations without tracking their reliability. However, for
these decisions to be optimal, there is a functional reason to expect metacognition to be involved
in the workspace. It is likely that a computational principle, relied on by many other cognitive pro-
cesses and which would allow the workspace to perform its functions more effectively, would be4 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xx
Box 2. Computational Basis of the Functional Argument
When a cognitive process is presented with items of information that conﬂict or support one another, a computational
route to integrating them optimally is to weigh each item of information by its respective reliability. This requires a conﬁ-
dence parameter to be assigned to each: (i) weighting by conﬁdence operates as an optimal or near-optimal basis for in-
tegration within a sensory modality [104], across two sensory modalities [25,26,105], and in motor control [106]; (ii)
therefore, the brain must somehow represent information about uncertainty for use in its computations [78]. Signals that
appear to have this role are widely observed in the brain [107–110]; (iii) computations that weight information by conﬁdence
can be used to solve problems of robotic control [111]. Conﬁdence-involving computations have recently begun to gain
prominence in artiﬁcial intelligence research [112]; (iv) coarse-graining and other kinds of simpliﬁcation of the right kind
enable better communication of the causal structure of systems than at the microscale [87]. Optimising the simpliﬁcation
requiresmetacognitive parameters; (v) a common currency for representations (e.g., scale-free) enables direct comparison
of representations. Computation of a common currency involves a metacognitive parameter (e.g., standard scores)
[27,35]; (vi) achievement of complex, multistep planning requires heuristics that efﬁciently simplify, approximate, and hier-
archically decompose hard tasks into simpler subtasks. Optimising the cost of computing the values of choices requires
access to metacognitive parameters [88,113]; and (vii) thus, the functional argument for conﬁdence marking, which a
prominent global workspace theorist has argued applies to information shared between individuals ([24]
pp. 111–112,247), is equally applicable when representations have to be integrated and weighed within an individual in
the global workspace.
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Trends in Coimplemented in the workspace. Therefore, we should expect representations in the global
workspace to involve metacognition, in the form of conﬁdence, or some other relevant
metacognitive parameter.
This is an argument for conﬁdence being relied on by theWMmanipulation processes that weigh,
integrate and decide; that is, for the conﬁdence information itself being globally available. Thus,
we can think of an item in the workspace as representing something about the world and at
the same time representing the accuracy of that representation. The content it makes globally
available includes both aspects.
In deﬁning metacognition earlier, we saw that not all probabilistic representations are
metacognitive. Our functional argument supports the existence of metacognitive contents, not
simply probabilistic contents, in the global workspace. As with cue combination, appropriate
weighing and integrating in the workspace should largely be based on the reliability of the cogni-
tive processes by which percepts were formed and selected for global broadcast (similarly for af-
fective, motoric, and mnemonic representations). Conﬁdence estimates are also relied for
cognitive control. On both grounds [33] they fall within the purview of metacognition. Evidence
of their intimate relation to conﬁdence reports and load sensitive processing supports this conclu-
sion, as do the brain areas involved (Box 3).
Common Currency
The function of the workspace is to allow highly disparate representations to be brought together
so that cognitive work can be done with them. Incompatible representations drive one another
out of the workspace, whereas compatible representations support one another in the
workspace synergistically [34]. However, for these representations to be integrated, some form
of common currency is required. One solution would be to use scale-free (normalised) represen-
tations. In statistics, for example, normalisation typically uses a ‘conﬁdence’measure, such as the
standard deviation, to generate a standard score, (X-μ)/σ. In this way, conﬁdence can supply a
common currency between different sensory modalities [27]. In the weighted conﬁdence-sharing
model, which gives a good account of the integration of information across people, conﬁdence
ratings are shared in the form of standard scores [32].
Common currency has also been discussed in relation to value. This is necessary for making choices
between different types of reward. Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)/orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)
has been identiﬁed as the region where value is represented in a common currency [35].gnitive Sciences, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xx 5
Box 3. Further Evidence in Favour of the Hypothesis
Fluency
Fluency affects the metacognitive ratings that are associated with workspace representations. A robust ﬁnding across
many different tasks is that conﬁdence is boosted by ﬂuency of various kinds (perceptual, conceptual, motoric: [114]).
Thus, potential answers presented 100 ms more quickly are more likely to be judged correct [46]. Falsely high conﬁdence
engendered by misleading ﬂuency cues probably underlies people’s tendency to stick with an initial incorrect answer in
reasoning problems [115]. Conﬁdence in memories is also partially determined by the ﬂuency of retrieved information [15].
Learning
Learning about the environment can occur even in the absence of external feedback. This kind of learning is guided by self-
generated feedback that is based on subjective conﬁdence ratings [116–118]. Subjective conﬁdence is used to weight
prior knowledge and incoming evidence by their respective reliability [110]. Individuals with a better correspondence be-
tween conﬁdence judgments and prediction accuracy learn more quickly [119]. Individuals with better metacognitive ac-
curacy for a perceptual decision are also better able to learn novel arbitrary cue–stimulus associations for the stimuli the
perceptual decision was based on [120].
Brain
The brain regions implicated in metacognition are also implicated in the manipulation of items in the workspace. This ap-
plies, in particular to the frontopolar cortex [Brodmann area (BA) 10], the region of frontal cortex most expanded in the hu-
man brain [121,122]. BA 10 is involved with making conﬁdence judgements in both humans [54] and macaques [123]. In
humans, BA 10 is also seen as a gateway between sensory representations (whether input driven or self-generated) and
downstream supervisory processes, including WM manipulation [124,125], and also as a means for interposing different
behavioural plans into dorsolateral PFC so that the currently relevant plan can be executed at the right time [126], including
when a behaviour switch is based on accumulating uncertain evidence [127]. Thus, BA 10 is involved in inputting repre-
sentations intoWMmanipulation. Its role in metacognitive accuracy suggests that the representations passed through this
gateway are conﬁdence labelled, in line with our hypothesis.
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6 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xxScale-free representations will not be appropriate for domain-speciﬁc systems. For exam-
ple, reaching and grasping requires a precise representation of spatial scale in egocentric
coordinates. In working memory, by contrast, representations of space are thought to be
in allocentric coordinates [36]. After a delay, grasp scaling shifts from absolute to relative
metrics [37]. Allocentric representations provide a common currency for space that is in-
dependent of location and, therefore, not suitable for reaching actions. This distinction is
consistent with ﬁndings that affordance-based, in-the-moment action selection is not a
feature of the representations manipulated in working memory [38,39] and is further
supported by the double dissociation observed in the reaching behaviour of subjects
with visual form agnosia and those with optic ataxia. The former can perform online
reaching in-the-moment but are impaired when working memory is required and they
have to reach for a target that has disappeared [40]. Those with optic ataxia are impaired
at online reaching, but their performance improves after a delay [41–43]. Likewise, in the
normal case dual-task interference has greater effects on delayed grasping than does in-
the-moment grasping [44].
Sources of Uncertainty
There are several sources of uncertainty that affect manipulation in the workspace. For
example, I may see a Hershey Bar™ and be reminded that my nephew likes candy bars. How-
ever, I also remember that he is allergic to nuts. All the pieces of information in the workspace
relevant to my decision to buy the bar are associated with different levels of conﬁdence. Are
Hershey bars nut-free? Is Jack allergic to other things besides nuts? How likely is Jack to
have an allergic reaction? Will I feel regret if he does have an allergic reaction? Since the ﬁrst
representation has low conﬁdence and I anticipate regret with high conﬁdence, I decide not
to buy the bar.
Trends in Cognitive SciencesA major source of uncertainty in the conclusion of a reasoning task can be the reasoning process
itself [45]. For instance, in assessing a solution to an anagram, perceptual uncertainty about what
the letters are is unlikely to be relevant, compared with uncertainty about the steps that mediate
between the anagram and its putative solution [46].
In a perceptual decision-making task, by contrast, the primary source of uncertainty in the deci-
sion is uncertainty in the percepts on which it is based [47–52]. Perceptual decision-making is not
normally considered to be a working memory task. However, it does often involve comparing or
manipulating items. The subject may have to decide whether the preponderant direction of mo-
tion of a random dot display lies to the left or right of a given reference line, or whether the ﬁrst or
second array of contrast gratings contains an oddball [53,54]. Thus, the decision is the result of a
computation that takes two globally broadcast representations as input. That decision then
needs to be held in working memory, together with an associated level of conﬁdence, to form
the basis of a subsequent conﬁdence report (the output process).
Evidence That Metacognitive Parameters Are Represented in the Workspace
Our hypothesis makes the strong prediction that every representation subject to manipulation in
the workspace should have a metacognitive component. If it were combined with the claim that
representations outside the workspace always lack a metacognitive component, the hypothesis
would be straightforward to test. However, since conﬁdence is also often found in nonconscious
representations [16,17], our contention is that metacognition is ever-present in the global
workspace and only sometimes present elsewhere. Although that is a difﬁcult prediction to test
exhaustively, there is much positive evidence for it. This evidence comes from studies exploring:
(i) explicit reports of conﬁdence; (ii) the relationship between conﬁdence and cognitive load; and
(iii) automatic error detection using error-related negativity signals. Box 3 discusses additional ev-
idence in favour of the hypothesis from studies of fluency, learning, and brain mechanisms.
Explicit Reports of Conﬁdence
If working memory representations have a metacognitive component, then we would expect
conﬁdence ratings in working memory tasks to correlate, to some extent, with task performance.
This is the case for visual working memory tasks, suggesting that representations held in working
memory do contain more than a point estimate [55,56]. This is well captured by a model in which
working memory representations are associated with a precision parameter, which is trans-
formed to give a reported level of conﬁdence [31,57]. Conversely, for behaviour based on repre-
sentations that are not globally broadcast (e.g., unconscious priming), there is no reason to
expect reported conﬁdence to correlate with performance and, indeed, in some paradigms it
does not [58,59].
The fact that percepts comewith a certainty or uncertainty that feeds into subjects’ reported con-
ﬁdence does not imply that the certainty perfectly tracks accuracy or that the subject will show
perfect metacognitive efﬁciency. Conﬁdence reports are a measure but only an imperfect mea-
sure of accuracy [60]. Metacognitive accuracy for detection is higher for stimulus-present than
for stimulus-absent trials [61]. A ready explanation for this is that percepts carry a (moderately re-
liable) certainty parameter, on which the subject’s conﬁdence judgement is based when there is a
stimulus present. When there is no stimulus, there is no percept and, hence, no accompanying
certainty parameter, leaving the subject with little basis for making reliable conﬁdence
judgements.
The ﬁnding that metacognition can be inaccurate also features in work on metamemory. Exten-
sive research on themetacognition of memory has shown that retrievedmemories are associated
with a level of conﬁdence. That conﬁdence assignment is an imperfect guide to accuracy, since itTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xx 7
Trends in Cognitive Sciencesis based on cues and heuristics, such as ﬂuency of recall, that can be misleading [15]. The fact
that metacognitive accuracy is imperfect does not indicate, pace Dehaene et al. ([10] p. 6), that
conﬁdence dissociates from global broadcast. Rather, metamemory research conﬁrms that
memories retrieved into the global workspace are accompanied by a measure of conﬁdence, al-
beit one that is imperfect.
The Relationship between Cognitive Load and Conﬁdence
One way of testing whether a conﬁdence parameter lies in or outside the global workspace is to
see whether it is affected by concurrent working memory load. It is well established that cognitive
load reduces the precision with which items are coded in working memory [62,63]; thus, if con-
ﬁdence representations are indeed in the workspace, we should expect them to be compromised
by cognitive load. Of course, cognitive load has wide-ranging effects on performance, so this is
not a very speciﬁc prediction. However, there is no across-the-board reasonwhy conﬁdence rep-
resented outside the workspace should be directly affected by load.
In line with this prediction, metacognitive efﬁciency in a perceptual task is compromised by con-
current manipulation of items in an unrelated task (but not by mere maintenance) [64]. Since we
hypothesise that percepts carry a conﬁdence parameter in addition to their object-level contents
about the world, it should be possible to interfere with metacognition while preserving object-level
task performance. Indeed, loading or interfering with working memory can have the effect of re-
ducing conﬁdence even when performance is not affected [60].
Further supporting the relationship between conﬁdence and cognitive load, studies have found
that individual differences in working memory capacity are correlated with metacognitive perfor-
mance [65]. Individuals with higher capacity are more able to adjust their response bias to ac-
count for their perceptual sensitivity [66]. Similarly, model-based reasoning, which calls for the
manipulation of probabilities in working memory, is stronger in subjects who exercise more cog-
nitive control in standard tasks [67] and is impaired by cognitive load [68]. Perceptual and
metacognitive vigilance appear to depend on a shared, limited cognitive resource [69].
Finally, it is known that executive working memory load, as well as visuospatial load, increases the
detection threshold in a visual task [70]. This kind of modulation does not appear to extend to rep-
resentations that are not conscious. In a task in which both low-visibility and high-visibility items
contribute to a decision, a top-down modulation that aimed to reduce reliance on incoming evi-
dence only had the effect of reducing reliance on high-visibility stimuli, not on low-visibility stimuli
[71]. Thus, the way that WMmanipulation affects conﬁdence appears to be speciﬁc to represen-
tations that have been made globally available (high-visibility stimuli). Conversely, conﬁrming evi-
dence that aids task performance but is only represented unconsciously does not improve
metacognitive performance [72].
Automatic Error Detection
Our hypothesis contends that conscious representations always have a metacognitive compo-
nent. However, it is possible that these are only induced when a conﬁdence judgement is called
for. The phenomenon of automatic error detection [16,73] provides evidence that this is not the
case. Automatic error detection can be assessed using the classic error-related negativity
(ERN) signal recorded from frontocentral electroencephalogram (EEG) electrodes. This signal oc-
curs ~100 ms after an incorrect response. Critically, the ERN is produced even when participants
are not instructed to make a conﬁdence judgement, provided that the relevant stimuli have been
consciously perceived [16]. Furthermore, the magnitude of the ERN is reduced under cognitive
load [74] and increased when the subject has less conﬁdence in a perceptual decision [75].
Error positivity (Pe) also scales with conﬁdence [76]. The fact that the ERN is produced by an8 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xx
Outstanding Questions
How is conﬁdence in aworkspace repre-
sentation computed from probability dis-
tributions in the domain-speciﬁc systems
that broadcast it?
Is there a conﬁdence threshold, below
which a representation cannot enter the
workspace?
How is the conﬁdence associated with a
percept related to its acuity and its re-
ported visibility?
Is the conﬁdence attached to an item in
the workspace affected by the conﬁ-
dence attached to other items in the
workspace?
Does the conﬁdence rating of a
workspace representation affect the
way attention is directed?
Does it take more attention to sustain a
low- than a high-conﬁdence representa-
tion in the global workspace?
How does the level of conﬁdence re-
ported in explicit judgements relate to
Trends in Cognitive Sciencesautomatic process suggests that the conﬁdence signals that drive it are always present when a
response is based on conscious stimuli.
Concluding Remarks
On the basis of a functional analysis, we have argued that metacognitive parameters have a crit-
ical role in the manipulation of representations that have been globally broadcast to the
workspace. We have also highlighted some of the empirical evidence in favour of this proposal.
This evidence suggests an extensive entanglement between metacognition and manipulation in
working memory.
Of course, future work should continue to investigate this entangled relationship and test speciﬁc
predictions of our hypothesis (Box 4). For example, it is unclear how the conﬁdence that an agent
reports in an explicit decision task (e.g., when making a forced choice between two alternatives)
relates to the conﬁdence parameter associated with each of the two percepts that have been
broadcast to the global workspace. Fortunately, implicit behavioural and neural signals of conﬁ-
dence and automatic error detection are known and, therefore, future work could systematically
investigate how these relate to the levels of conﬁdence explicitly reported by subjects (see Out-
standing Questions).
Recently, there have been advances in training people to control patterns of brain activity (using
decoded neural feedback [77]). These advances mean that it might be possible to intervene
directly on the conﬁdence attached to representations in the workspace. For example, it may
be possible to bias a participant’s choice in favour of or against the second of two stimuli by sim-
ply instructing them before the second stimulus to activate a high- or low-conﬁdence neural pat-the conﬁdence accompanying the per-
cepts on which judgements are based,
measured implicitly (e.g., through reac-
tion times or automatic error detection)?
Our hypothesis implies that, for con-
scious percepts, the effect of evidence
strength on decision conﬁdence should
be affected by load, whereas, for uncon-
scious percepts, it should not. Can un-
conscious primes be used to test for
this asymmetry?
Does the conﬁdence revealed by the
way reaching is executed reﬂect the pos-
itive evidence bias?
If participants are trained through
decoded neural feedback (DecNef) to
produce the neural signature of low con-
ﬁdence, does that reduce the weight
placed on the information in a concurrent
stimulus when it is integrated into a sub-
sequent decision?
Similarly, will DecNef for a low-conﬁ-
dence pattern increase the rate of cor-
rect responses in reasoning problems
where the intuitive solution is incorrect?
Is there a common neural mechanism
(e.g., in Brodmann area 10) for assigning
conﬁdence to representations that are
Box 4. Additional Predictions
Cognitive Load
Our hypothesis predicts that loading WMmanipulation should always impair metacognitive accuracy. It should also com-
promise the ability to weight representations by conﬁdence in the course of WM manipulation. Thus, we predict that load
will cause subjects to give undue weight to low-conﬁdence representations when taking decisions or reaching conclu-
sions, similar to the way load disposes people to believe what they hear uncritically [128].
Where stimuli that are unseen as well as those that are seen contribute to a perceptual decision, the hypothesis predicts
that it is only conﬁdence in consciously experienced stimuli that will be modulated by concurrent working memory load.
This could be tested by adding unconscious (noisy) primes into the design of [64], in which the impact of WMmanipulation
on metacognitive efﬁciency was ﬁrst demonstrated.
We have seen that the ERN is higher for low-conﬁdence stimuli [75] and is affected by load [74]. A straightforward further
prediction is that the extent to which high- versus low-conﬁdence percepts generate a difference in ERN should be re-
duced under cognitive load.
Online versus Offline Reaching and Grasping
We have already referred to the distinction between online reaching and action guidance after a delay (under ‘Common
Currency’ in main text). Only the latter is guided by representations in workingmemory and is strongly affected by dual-task
interference. Online reaching and grasping requires precise representations of location in allocentric coordinates, whereas
ofﬂine reaching and grasping plausibly uses a common currency in allocentric coordinates. The hypothesis predicts that
noise should affect these two systems in different ways.
There is evidence that speeded reaching can integrate information over trials in a Bayes optimal manner [129]. Our hypoth-
esis predicts that noise will have a different effect on reaching trajectories in the online case (all evidence is probabilistically
integrated into the decision) than in the ofﬂine case (only the pared-down location-plus-conﬁdence affects reaching). In the
latter, but not the former, the reaching trajectory should show the positive evidence bias (the ﬁnding that conﬁdence in a
two-alternative forced choice only reﬂects the amount of positive evidence for the decision, not the balance between ev-
idence for and against the decision [50,51,56]). Such a result would support our characterisation of the nature of represen-
tations in the workspace.
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input to the global workspace, or are
there different neural mechanisms of
conﬁdence assignment for different
domain-speciﬁc systems?
Trends in Cognitive Sciencestern. Furthermore, if conﬁdence lowering extended to other tasks, for example the tendency to
endorse an intuitive but incorrect answer in a verbal judgement-and-decision problem, then
that would show that the mechanism for assigning conﬁdence to representations broadcast to
the workspace is domain general.
In conclusion, our proposal reﬁnes our understanding of the nature of both the global workspace
and the representations it makes globally available. That brings us one step closer to a better
characterisation of consciousness.
Acknowledgements
For helpful comments, the authors would like to thank two anonymous referees, Ned Block, and audiences at the Institute of
Philosophy and at the 2018 Annual Conference of the Association for the Scientiﬁc Study of Consciousness. This project has
received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and
Innovation Programme under grant agreement No. 681422 (MetCogCon).References
1. Baddeley, A. (1992) Consciousness and working memory.
Conscious. Cogn. 1, 3–6
2. Baars, B.J. (1988) A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness,
Cambridge University Press
3. Dehaene, S. and Naccache, L. (2001) Towards a cognitive
neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a
workspace framework. Cognition 79, 1–37
4. Dehaene, S. and Changeux, J.-P. (2011) Experimental and
theoretical approaches to conscious processing. Neuron 70,
200–227
5. Kunimoto, C. et al. (2001) Conﬁdence and accuracy of near-
threshold discrimination responses. Conscious. Cogn. 10,
294–340
6. Persaud, N. et al. (2011) Awareness-related activity in prefron-
tal and parietal cortices in blindsight reﬂects more than supe-
rior visual performance. NeuroImage 58, 605–611
7. Cleeremans, A. (2014) Connecting conscious and uncon-
scious processing. Cogn. Sci. 38, 1286–1315
8. Fleming, S.M. and Lau, H.C. (2014) How to measure metacog-
nition. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8, 443
9. Matthews, J. et al. (2018) Conscious access in the near ab-
sence of attention: critical extensions on the dual-task para-
digm. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B 373, 20170352
10. Dehaene, S. et al. (2017) What is consciousness, and could
machines have it? Science 358, 486–492
11. Rosenthal, R. (2005)Consciousness andMind,Clarendon Press
12. Beck, J.M. et al. (2008) Probabilistic population codes for
Bayesian decision making. Neuron 60, 1142–1152
13. Nelson, T.O. (1996) Consciousness and metacognition. Am.
Psychol. 51, 102–116
14. Koriat, A. (2007) Metacognition and consciousness. In Cam-
bridge Handbook of Consciousness (Zelazo, P.D., et al.,
eds), pp. 289–326, Cambridge University Press
15. Koriat, A. (2015) Metacognition: decision-making processes in
self-monitoring and self-regulation. In The Wiley Blackwell
Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making (Keren, G. and
Wu, G., eds), pp. 356–379, Wiley–Blackwell
16. Charles, L. et al. (2013) Distinct brain mechanisms for con-
scious versus subliminal error detection. Neuroimage 73,
80–94
17. Kanai, R. et al. (2010) Subjective discriminability of invisibility: a
framework for distinguishing perceptual and attentional failures
of awareness. Conscious. Cogn. 19, 1045–1057
18. Jachs, B. et al. (2015) On the independence of visual aware-
ness and metacognition: a signal detection theoretic analysis.
J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 41, 269–276
19. Timmermans, B. et al. (2012) Higher order thoughts in action:
consciousness as an unconscious re-description process.
Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B 367, 1412–1423
20. Fleming, S.M. et al. (2012) Metacognition: computation biology
and function. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B 367, 1280–1286
21. Snodgrass, M. et al. (2009) Access is mainly a second-order
process: SDT models whether phenomenally (ﬁrst-order)
conscious states are accessed by reﬂectively (second-order)
conscious processes. Conscious. Cogn. 18, 561–564
22. Dehaene, S. (2009) Neural global workspace. In The Oxford
Companion to Consciousness (Bayne, T., et al., eds), pp.
466–470, Oxford University Press
23. Shea, N.J. et al. (2014) Supra-personal cognitive control and
metacognition. Trends Cogn. Sci. 18, 186–193
24. Dehaene, S. (2014) Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering
How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts, Viking (The Penguin Group)
25. Ernst, M.O. and Banks, M.S. (2002) Humans integrate visual
and haptic information in a statistically optimal fashion. Nature
415, 429–433
26. Deroy, O. et al. (2016) Metacognition in multisensory percep-
tion. Trends Cogn. Sci. 20, 736–747
27. de Gardelle, V. et al. (2016) Conﬁdence as a common currency
between vision and audition. PLoS ONE 11, e0147901
28. Prinz, J. (2012) The Conscious Brain, Oxford University Press
29. Moran, R. et al. (2015) Post choice information integration as a
causal determinant of conﬁdence: novel data and a computa-
tional account. Cogn. Psychol. 78, 99–147
30. Rahnev, D. et al. (2016) Causal evidence for frontal cortex or-
ganization for perceptual decision making. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U. S. A. 113, 6059–6064
31. Fleming, S.M. et al. (2018) Neural mediators of changes of
mind about perceptual decisions. Nat. Neurosci. 21, 617–624
32. Bahrami, B. et al. (2010) Optimally interacting minds. Science
329, 1081–1085
33. Nelson, T.O. and Narens, L. (1990) Metamemory: a theoretical
framework and new ﬁndings. Psychol. Learn. Motiv. 26, 125–141
34. MacGregor, L.J. et al. (2015) Sustained meaning activation for
polysemous but not homonymous words: evidence from EEG.
Neuropsychologia 68, 126–138
35. Levy, D.J. and Glimcher, P.W. (2012) The root of all value: a
neural common currency for choice. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol.
22, 1027–1038
36. Schenk, T. (2006) An allocentric rather than perceptual deﬁcit
in patient D.F. Nat. Neurosci. 9, 1369–1370
37. Hu, Y. and Goodale, M.A. (2000) Grasping after a delay shifts
size-scaling from absolute to relative metrics. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 12, 856–868
38. Pecher, D. et al. (2013) The role of affordances for working
memory for objects. J. Cogn. Psychol. 25, 107–118
39. Still, J.D. and Dark, V.J. (2010) Examining working memory
load and congruency effects on affordances and conventions.
Int. J. Hum. Comput. St. 68, 561–571
40. Goodale, M.A. et al. (1994) Differences in the visual control of
pantomimed and natural grasping movements.
Neuropsychologia 32, 1159–1178
41. Milner, A.D. et al. (2001) Grasping the past: delay can improve
visuomotor performance. Curr. Biol. 11, 1896–1901
42. Schindler, I. et al. (2004) Automatic avoidance of obstacles is a
dorsal stream function: evidence from optic ataxia. Nat.
Neurosci. 7, 77910 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xx
Trends in Cognitive Sciences43. Rice, N.J. et al. (2008) Delay abolishes the obstacle avoidance
deﬁcit in unilateral optic ataxia. Neuropsychologia 46,
1549–1557
44. Singhal, A. et al. (2007) Dual-task interference is greater in de-
layed grasping than in visually guided grasping. J. Vis. 7,
5.1–12
45. Ackerman, R. and Thompson, V.A. (2017) Meta-reasoning:
monitoring and control of thinking and reasoning. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 21, 607–617
46. Topolinski, S. and Reber, R. (2010) Immediate truth – temporal
contiguity between a cognitive problem and its solution deter-
mines experienced veracity of the solution. Cognition 114,
117–122
47. Aitchison, L. et al. (2015) Doubly Bayesian analysis of conﬁ-
dence in perceptual decision-making. PLoS Comput. Biol.
11, e1004519
48. Bang, J.W. et al. (2019) Sensory noise increases metacognitive
efﬁciency. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 148, 437–452
49. Navajas, J. et al. (2017) The idiosyncratic nature of conﬁdence.
Nat. Hum. Behav. 1, 810–818
50. Zylberberg, A. et al. (2012) Decision making during the psycho-
logical refractory period. Curr. Biol. 22, 1795–1799
51. Maniscalco, B. and Lau, H. (2016) The signal processing archi-
tecture underlying subjective reports of sensory awareness.
Neurosci. Conscious. 2016, niw002
52. Palser, E.R. et al. (2018) Altering movement parameters
disrupts metacognitive accuracy. Conscious. Cogn. 57,
33–40
53. Luu, L. and Stocker, A.A. (2018) Post-decision biases reveal a
self-consistency principle in perceptual inference. eLife 7,
e33334
54. Fleming, S.M. et al. (2010) Relating introspective accuracy to
individual differences in brain structure. Science 329,
1541–1543
55. Rademaker, R.L. et al. (2012) Introspective judgments predict
the precision and likelihood of successful maintenance of visual
working memory. J. Vis. 12, 1–13
56. Peters, M.A. et al. (2017) Perceptual conﬁdence neglects
decision-incongruent evidence in the brain. Nat. Hum. Behav.
1, 0139
57. van den Berg, R. et al. (2017) Fechner’s law in metacognition: a
quantitative model of visual working memory conﬁdence.
Psychol. Rev. 124, 197–214
58. Koizumi, A. et al. (2015) Does perceptual conﬁdence facilitate
cognitive control? Atten. Percept. Psychophys. 77,
1295–1306
59. Samaha, J. et al. (2016) Dissociating perceptual conﬁdence
from discrimination accuracy reveals no inﬂuence of
metacognitive awareness on working memory. Front. Psychol.
7, 851
60. Bona, S. and Silvanto, J. (2014) Accuracy and conﬁdence of vi-
sual short-term memory do not go hand-in-hand: behavioral
and neural dissociations. PLoS ONE 9, e90808
61. Meuwese, J.D. et al. (2014) The subjective experience of object
recognition: comparing metacognition for object detection and
object categorization. Atten. Percept. Psychophys. 76,
1057–1068
62. Bays, P.M. and Husain, M. (2008) Dynamic shifts of limited
working memory resources in human vision. Science 321,
851–854
63. Suchow, J.W. et al. (2014) Terms of the debate on the format
and structure of visual memory. Atten. Percept. Psychophys.
76, 2071–2079
64. Maniscalco, B. and Lau, H. (2015) Manipulation of working
memory contents selectively impairs metacognitive sensitivity
in a concurrent visual discrimination task. Neurosci. Con-
scious. 2015, niv002
65. Komori, M. (2016) Effects of working memory capacity on
metacognitive monitoring: a study of group differences using
a listening span test. Front. Psychol. 7, 285
66. Lynn, S.K. et al. (2016) Working memory capacity is associated
with optimal adaptation of response bias to perceptual sensi-
tivity in emotion perception. Emotion 16, 155–163
67. Otto, A.R. et al. (2015) Cognitive control predicts use of model-
based reinforcement learning. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 27, 319–333
68. Otto, A.R. et al. (2013) The curse of planning: dissecting multi-
ple reinforcement-learning systems by taxing the central exec-
utive. Psychol. Sci. 24, 751–761
69. Maniscalco, B. et al. (2017) Limited cognitive resources explain
a trade-off between perceptual and metacognitive vigilance.
J. Neurosci. 37, 1213–1224
70. De Loof, E. et al. (2015) Different effects of executive and visuo-
spatial working memory on visual consciousness. Atten. Per-
cept. Psychophys. 77, 2523–2528
71. de Lange, F.P. et al. (2011) How awareness changes the rela-
tive weights of evidence during human decision-making. PLoS
Biol. 9, e1001203
72. Vlassova, A. et al. (2014) Unconscious information changes
decision accuracy but not conﬁdence. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U. S. A. 11, 16214–16218
73. Yeung, N. and Summerﬁeld, C. (2012) Metacognition in human
decision-making: conﬁdence and error monitoring. Philos.
Trans. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 367, 1310–1321
74. Krigolson, O.E. et al. (2012) Cognitive load impacts error eval-
uation within medial-frontal cortex. Brain Res. 1430, 62–67
75. Scheffers, M.K. and Coles, M.G.H. (2000) Performance moni-
toring in a confusing world: error-related brain activity, judg-
ments of response accuracy, and types of errors. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 26, 141–151
76. Boldt, A. and Yeung, N. (2015) Shared neural markers of decision
conﬁdence and error detection. J. Neurosci. 35, 3478–3484
77. Cortese, A. et al. (2016) Multivoxel neurofeedback selectively
modulates conﬁdence without changing perceptual perfor-
mance. Nat. Commun. 7, 13669
78. Knill, D.C. and Pouget, A. (2004) The Bayesian brain: the role of
uncertainty in neural coding and computation. Trends
Neurosci. 27, 712–719
79. Shen, S. and Ma, W.J. (2016) A detailed comparison of opti-
mality and simplicity in perceptual decision making. Psychol.
Rev. 123, 452–480
80. Rahnev, D. and Denison, R.N. (2018) Suboptimality in percep-
tual decision making. Behav. Brain Sci. 41, e225
81. Ma, W.J. et al. (2006) Bayesian inference with probabilistic
population codes. Nat. Neurosci. 9, 1432–1438
82. Keshvari, S. et al. (2012) Probabilistic computation in human
perception under variability in encoding precision. PLoS ONE
7, e40216
83. Block, N. (2018) If perception is probabilistic, why does it not
seem probabilistic? Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B 373, 20170341
84. Stocker, A. and Simoncelli, E.P. (2008) A Bayesian model of
conditioned perception. Adv. Neural Inf. Proces. Syst. 20,
1409–1416
85. Dehaene, S. and Sigman, M. (2012) From a single decision to a
multi-step algorithm. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 22, 937–945
86. Rahnev, D. (2017) The case against full probability distributions
in perceptual decision making. bioRxiv 2017, 108944
87. Hoel, E.P. (2017) When the map is better than the territory. En-
tropy 19, 188
88. Huys, Q.J. et al. (2015) Interplay of approximate planning strat-
egies. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 112, 3098–3103
89. Bang, D. et al. (2017) Conﬁdence matching in group decision-
making. Nat. Hum. Behav. 1, 0117
90. Hertz, U. et al. (2017) Neural computations underpinning the
strategic management of inﬂuence in advice giving. Nat.
Commun. 8, 2191
91. Owen, A.M. et al. (1996) Double dissociations of memory and
executive functions in working memory tasks following frontal
lobe excisions, temporal lobe excisions or amygdalo-
hippocampectomy in man. Brain 119, 1597–1615
92. Petrides, M. and Milner, B. (1982) Deﬁcits on subject-ordered
tasks after frontal- and temporal-lobe lesions in man.
Neuropsychologia 20, 249–262
93. Petrides, M. (2000) The role of the mid-dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex in working memory. Exp. Brain Res. 133, 44–54
94. Stokes, M.G. (2015) ‘Activity-silent’ working memory in pre-
frontal cortex: a dynamic coding framework. Trends Cogn.
Sci. 19, 394–405
95. King, J-R. et al. (2016) Brain mechanisms underlying the brief
maintenance of seen and unseen sensory information. Neuron
92, 1122–1134Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xx 11
Trends in Cognitive Sciences96. Trübutschek, D. et al. (2017) A theory of working memory with-
out consciousness or sustained activity. eLife 6, e23871
97. Stein, T. et al. (2016) Can working memory be non-conscious?
Neurosci. Conscious. 2016, niv011
98. Soto, D. and Silvanto, J. (2016) Is conscious awareness
needed for all working memory processes? Neurosci. Con-
scious. 2016, niw009
99. Soto, D. et al. (2011) Working memory without consciousness.
Curr. Biol. 21, R912–R913
100. Sklar, A.Y. et al. (2012) Reading and doing arithmetic
nonconsciously. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 109, 19614–19619
101. Soto, D. and Silvanto, J. (2014) Reappraising the relationship
between working memory and conscious awareness. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 18, 520–525
102. Jacobs, C. et al. (2018) Visual working memory performance in
aphantasia. Cortex 105, 61–73
103. Wahn, B. and König, P. (2015) Vision and haptics share spatial
attentional resources and visuotactile integration is not affected
by high attentional load. Multisens. Res. 28, 371–392
104. Jacobs, R.A. (1999) Optimal integration of texture and motion
cues to depth. Vis. Res. 39, 3621–3629
105. Alais, D. and Burr, D. (2004) The ventriloquist effect results from
near-optimal bimodal integration. Curr. Biol. 14, 257–262
106. Körding, K.P. and Wolpert, D.M. (2004) Bayesian integration in
sensorimotor learning. Nature 427, 244
107. Summerﬁeld, C. and Koechlin, E. (2008) A neural representa-
tion of prior information during perceptual inference. Neuron
59, 336–347
108. Fetsch, C.R. et al. (2012) Neural correlates of reliability-based
cue weighting during multisensory integration. Nat. Neurosci.
15, 146–154
109. De Martino, B. et al. (2017) Social information is integrated into
value and conﬁdence judgments according to its reliability.
J. Neurosci. 37, 6066–6074
110. Meyniel, F. and Dehaene, S. (2017) Brain networks for conﬁ-
dence weighting and hierarchical inference during probabilistic
learning. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 114, E3859–E3868
111. Thrun, S. et al. (2001) Robust Monte Carlo localization for mo-
bile robots. Artif. Intell. 128, 99–141
112. Ghahramani, Z. (2015) Probabilistic machine learning and artiﬁ-
cial intelligence. Nature 521, 452–459
113. Gershman, S.J. et al. (2014) Retrospective revaluation in se-
quential decision making: a tale of two systems. J. Exp.
Psychol. Gen. 143, 182–194
114. Unkelbach, C. and Greifeneder, R. (2013) A general model
of ﬂuency effects in judgment and decision making. In The
Experience of Thinking: How the Fluency of Mental Pro-
cesses Inﬂuences Cognition and Behaviour (Unkelbach, C.
and Greifender, R., eds), pp. 11–32, Psychology Press
115. Thompson, V.A. et al. (2013) Matching bias on the
selection task: it’s fast and feels good. Think. Reason.
19, 431–452
116. Daniel, R. and Pollmann, S. (2012) Striatal activations signal
prediction errors on conﬁdence in the absence of external feed-
back. NeuroImage 59, 3457–3467
117. Guggenmos, M. et al. (2016) Mesolimbic conﬁdence signals
guide perceptual learning in the absence of external feedback.
eLife 5, e13388
118. Guggenmos, M. and Sterzer, P. (2017) A conﬁdence-based
reinforcement learning model for perceptual learning. bioRxiv
2017, 136903
119. Frömer, R. et al. (2018) I knew that! Conﬁdence in outcome
prediction and its impact on feedback processing and learning.
bioRxiv 2018, 44282
120. Hainguerlot, M. et al. (2018) Metacognitive ability predicts learn-
ing cue–stimulus associations in the absence of external feed-
back. Sci. Rep. 8, 5602
121. Donahue, C.J. et al. (2018) Quantitative assessment of prefron-
tal cortex in humans relative to nonhuman primates. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 115, E5183–E5192
122. Semendeferi, K. et al. (2001) Prefrontal cortex in humans and apes:
a comparative study of area 10. Am. J. Phys. Anthropol. 114,
224–241
123. Miyamoto, K. et al. (2018) Reversible silencing of the
frontopolar cortex selectively impairs metacognitive judgment
on non-experience in primates. Neuron 97, 980–989
124. Burgess, P.W. et al. (2007) The gateway hypothesis of rostral
prefrontal cortex (area 10) function. Trends Cogn. Sci. 11,
290–298
125. Burgess, P.W. et al. (2007) Function and localization within ros-
tral prefrontal cortex (area 10). Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. Ser.
B Biol. Sci. 362, 887–899
126. Koechlin, E. and Hyaﬁl, A. (2007) Anterior prefrontal function
and the limits of human decision-making. Science 318,
594–598
127. Boorman, E.D. et al. (2009) How green is the grass on the other
side? Frontopolar cortex and the evidence in favor of alternative
courses of action. Neuron 62, 733–743
128. Gilbert, D.T. (1991) How mental systems believe. Am. Psychol.
46, 107–119
129. Hudson, T.E. et al. (2012) Speeded reaching movements
around invisible obstacles. PLoS Comput. Biol. 8, e100267612 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xx
